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In February 2016, the Sentencing Council issued a consultation which is intended to encourage a 
greater number of defendants to enter a guilty plea at the ‘first reasonable opportunity’. Currently, 
s.144 Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that a sentence discount for a guilty plea can be given by 
the court and the amount of discount is dependent on two factors; the stage in the proceedings 
which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty and the circumstances in which the 
indication was given.   
The new proposals will provide a tiered approach to the amount of discount offered. The first tier 
provides the maximum discount of one-third should they indicate a guilty plea at the first time they 
are asked in court. The second tier has a discount of one-fifth should the defendant enter a guilty 
plea at a later opportunity but before the trial commences. The third tier states that should the 
defendant enter a guilty plea on the first day of their trial they will only receive a discount of one-
tenth. Finally, should the defendant enter a guilty plea part way through the trial, they will not be 
eligible for any sentence discount.  
The consultation outlines the importance of an early guilty plea; such a plea has numerous benefits, 
including:  
 Victims and witnesses will be informed earlier than in the past that their evidence will not be 
necessary. Furthermore, victims will see a more consistent approach to determining 
sentence reductions.  
 Earlier guilty pleas will represent a significant resource saving for the police, CPS, the Legal 
Aid Agency and the courts. 
 Defence lawyers will have a clearer idea of the likely outcome for clients who choose to 
enter a guilty plea at different stages of the criminal process and can therefore provide 
better advice to clients.  
The primacy of improving the efficiency of the criminal justice process can be traced back to the turn 
of the Century and remains a central goal (see, for example, Brian Leveson’s ‘Review of Efficiency in 
Criminal Proceedings’ and the ongoing Transforming Summary Justice initiative). The creation of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules in 2005 (hereafter, CrimPR) codified this desire and created an Overriding 
Objective of ‘dealing with cases justly’ which includes ‘dealing with the case efficiently and 
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expeditiously’ (Rule 1.1(1)(e)). Lord Justice Auld’s 2001 Review of the Criminal Courts of England and 
Wales summarises the modern approach to criminal proceedings: 
‘[A] criminal trial is not a game under which a guilty defendant should be provided with a 
sporting chance. It is a search for truth in accordance with the twin principles that the 
prosecution must prove its case and that a defendant is not obliged to inculpate himself…’  
The courts quickly adopted this approach and have continued to reiterate this principle over the last 
15 years (see R v Gleeson [2003] EWCA Crim 3357, R (on the application of the DPP) v Chorley 
Justices & Anor [2006] EWHC 1795, Malcolm v DPP [2007] EWHC 363 (QB), Payne v South Lakeland 
Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 1862 (Admin)). The Sentencing Council consultation also reiterates 
this very point at p.15, stating that the proposed changes leave ‘much less scope for offenders to 
play the system’. In summary, three assumptions are made by the modern approach to criminal 
procedure – defendants primarily wish to illegitimately manipulate criminal process; such behaviour 
compromises both the integrity and efficiency of the system; and steps must be taken (in the form of 
procedural changes) to prevent this.  
The consultation does explicitly acknowledge some of the basic due process rights of the defendant 
in our adversarial system, for example, the right against self-incrimination and to put the 
prosecution to proof. However, the tenor of the modern adversarial process appears to imply that 
defendants know if they are guilty or not, should be clear about this at an early stage, and be 
cooperative’. This notion of co-operation is evident in the various obligations the defence must 
discharge under the CrimPR. For example, the defence has to identify the ‘real issues’ they have with 
the prosecution’s case (Rule 3.2(2)(a)) and identify any significant failures or problems in case 
preparation and inform the court (see Rule 3.10 and various case law examples).  The Early Guilty 
Plea scheme continues in this vein, priortising efficiency and economy.  
The concept of the Early Guilty Plea scheme is not, in itself, an offensive one. Where a case is 
straightforward, a defendant accepts their guilt, and the evidence is substantial and undisputed, it 
seems justifiable to encourage a guilty plea at the initial stages, so long as the circumstances of the 
defendant do not negate his or her free and informed choice. In circumstances where these 
conditions are not met, the scheme poses problems. The scheme states that the discount is not a 
reward but an incentive, but this is arguably a matter semantics rather than substance. In reality, a 
defendant may view the discount as neither a reward for ‘doing the right thing’ and admitting guilt 
nor an incentive to  assist those prosecuting him or her - but as a temptation to reduce the risk of 
conviction for an offence they have not committed or an inducement to sacrifice their legitimate fair 
trial rights.  
Furthermore, any guilty plea should be grounded in sound legal advice based on the weight of 
evidence the prosecution holds. However, there is clear evidence that pre-trial disclosure by the CPS 
is often inadequate in practice and this poses a difficulty for defence lawyers (see the recent report 
by HM CPS Inspectorate ‘Transforming Summary Justice: An Early Perspective of the CPS 
Contribution’ and ‘The Practice of Pre-trial Detention in England and Wales’ by Cape and Smith). At 
present, there is little regulation of disclosure prior to the first hearing - the only point at which a 
defendant would be eligible for the maximum sentence discount for a guilty plea. The prosecution 
are only required to disclose Initial Details of the Prosecution Case (IDPC) if the defence request it 
(Rule 8.2(2)). The scope of this disclosure is narrow (particularly for defendants brought to court in 
custody): prosecutors are mandated to share details of circumstances of the offence and the 
criminal record of the defendant, and little else. This appears to be in breach of the EU directive of 
the right to information which, under Articles 6 and 7 requires extensive disclosure of materials and 
information essential to an effective defence. This poses a very serious question: How are defence 
lawyers expected to give sound legal advice as to plea when they are only advising on a partial 
picture of the evidence? Arguably, improvements in pre-trial disclosure should be explored rather 
than increasing the incentive/pressure to enter a guilty plea at the earliest opportunity. This could 
bolster equality of arms at the earliest stage of the process, assist defence lawyers in providing 
realistic advice to their clients, and avoid the risk of inappropriate ‘not guilty’ pleas being entered 
simply because the defence do not have enough information. 
The dangers of being pressured to enter a guilty plea are stark, demonstrated in the recent case of R 
v on the application of the DPP) v Leicester Magistrates’ Court (Unreported, 9th February 2016). The 
claimant appealed for judicial review to re-open his conviction for common assault. The offence had 
allegedly been committed against a 14-year-old boy, in the care of the defendant as an agency 
worker in a care home. At his first appearance in court, he intended to enter a not guilty plea on the 
basis of self-defence. However, he changed this on the first day of his trial. He asserts that his then- 
solicitor had pressured him into entering a guilty plea; as a result, he was no longer able to find work 
in the social care sector. Whilst the magistrates’ court can make an order to re-open a conviction 
when it is in the interests of justice (under s.142 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980) it can only be 
exercised where there has been a mistake or a situation akin to a mistake. A subsequent change of 
heart or regret at entering a guilty plea will not suffice as a mistake and the defendant’s conviction 
was reinstated. This is arguably a matter of interpretation. One could feasibly argue that ‘regret’ 
over changing a plea due to inappropriate pressure from lawyers is tantamount to a mistake. Clearly, 
the defendant’s first inclination was to plead not guilty, but he was persuaded to plead otherwise. In 
the same way that false confessions are subsequently considered to be mistaken when extracted 
under police pressure, there seems no logical reason why a ‘change of heart’ about a guilty plea in 
such circumstances should be considered any differently. In contrast, where a defendant pleads 
guilty and has a more vague or ill-defined ‘regret’ based on nothing more than the desire to avoid 
conviction, it seems more reasonable to prevent the overturning of convictions.  
Conclusion  
This article raises a number of issues related to early guilty pleas. At present, the defence are 
arguably given inadequate access to information prior to the first hearing. This can affect the ability 
of the defence lawyer to advise on the appropriate plea. Equally, a defendant may be pressured by 
his or her lawyer to enter a guilty plea or tempted to do so because of the sentence discount. In such 
cases, there is a risk that the overriding objective of the CrimPR will be undermined – that is, to deal 
with cases justly, which includes acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty, and ensuring that 
appropriate information is available to the court when bail is considered. Whilst it is important to 
consider the effects of lengthy criminal proceedings on victims and witness, it is often the defendant 
who is forgotten in any reform. The rise of the CrimPR and its implicit goals of managerialism have 
arguably diluted the adversarial nature of the criminal justice process, emphasising the importance 
of co-operation throughout proceedings. There is undoubtedly an agenda, for better or worse, to 
encourage defendants to enter early guilty pleas, and it seems that should the defendant regret 
doing so, a remedy will rarely be offered by the courts. It is therefore imperative to ensure that any 
decision to enter a guilty plea is based on full and accurate evidence from the police and 
prosecution, made available at an early stage. This is arguably commensurate with the objectives of 
the CrimPR and the general culture change that has seen a drift from away from pure adversarialism, 
where each parties hides their case for as long as possible. If sharing is to be encouraged, it should 
be done so on an equal basis. This would ensure the defence lawyer can adequately advise the client 
as to plea, Moreover, it would (perhaps ironically) re-assert the adversarial tradition of English and 
Welsh criminal justice by moving away from a system reliant on a defendant to ‘know’ when to 
plead guilty towards a system which requires the prosecution discharge the burden of proof by 
revealing the totality of their case from the beginning of the process. 
 
  
